UNITED
NATIONS

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General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

A/48/594
S/26733
15 November 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-eighth session
Agenda items 71, 72, 73 and 79
GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT
REVIEW AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT OF THE TWELFTH SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
REVIEW OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS AND DECISIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT ITS TENTH SPECIAL SESSION
REVIEW OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE STRENGTHENING OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-eighth year

Letter dated 11 November 1993 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to forward to you the statement dated 11 November 1993 issued by the Head of the Delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the DPRK-USA Talks (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have this letter, together with the enclosed Statement, circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 71, 72, 73 and 79, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) PAK Gil Yon
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Statement made on 11 November 1993 in Pyongyang by the First Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs and Head of the Delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the DPRK-USA High-Level Talks

Very ill-boding signs are appearing these days, beclouding the prospects of solution of the nuclear problem on the Korean peninsula.

Some quarters are painting an extremely pessimistic picture of the situation as if the continuity of the safeguards on our country's nuclear activities were on the verge of suspension, arguing that, if the Democratic People's Republic of Korea refuges to accept "a total inspection" by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) within a few days, "United Nations sanctions" must be imposed on it.

And it must not go unnoticed that, with a view to backing these arguments of theirs, they are concealing the essence of the nuclear problem on the Korean peninsula and are distorting fact to create the impression that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is playing a hide-and-seek to develop nuclear weapons, and are setting afloat the false rumour that it is using the nuclear problem as a bargaining chip to attain a certain selfish aim.

Taking into consideration the serious nature of the political purpose sought by the dishonest forces in spreading such arguments and rumours zealously, I deem it necessary to clarify the truth of the situation and our principled stand for a solution of the nuclear problem.

As is already known, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States sides published a Joint Statement after discussing and reaching an agreement on the matters of principle in the solution of the nuclear problem, and held talks on this basis.

In the Joint Statement, the two sides confirmed it as the basic principles of the solution of the nuclear problem to refrain from nuclear threats, respect each other's sovereignty, ensure a fair application of full guarantees and for the United States to support a peaceful reunification of Korea, and clearly defined the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States of America as the parties vested with chief responsibility and authority for the solution of this problem.

According to this, we have taken practical measures for the solution of the nuclear problem and acted in good faith in the course of the talks till today. With the publication of the DPRK-US Joint Statement, we unilaterally and temporarily suspended the effectuation of our declaration on our withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and resumed negotiation with IAEA and the North-South dialogue. And, under this special situation, we totally froze the movement of nuclear material within the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to fulfil our commitment to proving the transparency of our nuclear activities and allowed inspection for ensuring the continuity of safeguards in this regard.

Especially, we made a big bold decision to replace the existing graphite-moderated reactors with light water reactors at the expense of the independence of our nuclear power industry, in order to dispel fundamentally the so-called "suspicion of nuclear development" against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

All these sincere efforts, however, have failed to call forth a practical response from the United States side, and the current situation is developing in the opposite direction.

This is attributable to the faithless stance of the United States side, our dialogue partner, towards the talks. Contrary to the principles agreed upon at the past talks, outrageous words threatening and antagonizing the Democratic People's Republic of Korea have rolled off the tongues of official figures of the United States in succession and they are overtly revealing their intention to continue the "team spirit" military manoeuvres, nuclear war exercises against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. On the other hand, they brought the third-stage DPRK-USA Talks, which was to be held within two months, to a deadlock by setting unreasonable preconditions and orchestrated the adoption of a "resolution" laying the blame at our door during the General Conference of IAEA and the United Nations General Assembly.

All these facts show that, over the five months after the talks began, only the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has unilaterally moved to implement the points agreed upon at the talks, and the United States has not moved at all.

The spirit of the agreement at the talks that both sides should move simultaneously on an equal footing has been ignored by the United States side and, in the final analysis, this is the main cause of impasse in the solution of the nuclear problem.

This notwithstanding, the United States is trying to mislead public opinion as if the Democratic People's Republic of Korea were to blame for it. This fosters the suspicion that the United States still pursues a political purpose of stifling our Republic, unwilling to solve the nuclear problem in real earnest. Particularly, it is an act of reversing black and white to cry that the continuity of the safeguards of the nuclear activities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has been broken.

To guarantee that our nuclear activities will not be oriented to a military purpose until the nuclear problem has completely been solved through the DPRK-USA Talks, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has until now remained faithful to its promise to the United States that it will allow the readjustment and replacement of the inspection cameras of IAEA. Still now the inspection cameras and seals of IAEA remain on the nuclear facilities of our country.

Until now, we have allowed inspection teams of IAEA to change films and batteries of the inspection cameras, confirm their seals and readjust the cameras whenever necessary for IAEA on several occasions, and informed the Agency of our readiness to receive such inspection teams at any time it is requested. Considering the scale and conditions of our nuclear facilities, they can fully confirm only with the cameras that our nuclear activities had nothing to do with a military purpose.

When the cameras were readjusted and replaced in August, nobody was afraid that the continuity of safeguards might be broken. Though we consider that the observation by cameras alone is enough to ensure the continuity of safeguards, we, making allowances for the circumstances of the United States side, clearly manifested our magnanimous stand that the scope of inspection might be expanded and already held an informal negotiation with the United States side and then proposed a working-level negotiation with IAEA.

Nevertheless, the United States and IAEA are claiming that, if the continuity of safeguards is to be ensured, we must accept an overall inspection by IAEA, and set this as a precondition for the opening of the third-stage DPRK-USA Talks.

What the United States and IAEA demand is that we wholly comply with the Safeguard Agreement immediately at the present juncture.

Our full compliance with the Safeguards Agreement means our full return to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

As we made clear in a Statement of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, we declared our withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons because our Republic's supreme interests were in danger owing to the United States nuclear threat and the partiality of IAEA.

The United States came out to the DPRK-USA Talks because it admitted that it could not bring us back to the Treaty without a change in its nuclear threat and hostile policy towards Korea and the DPRK-USA Joint Statement was published against that background. Therefore, the United States, which has put into practice none of its commitments to us, has no face to demand us point-blank to return to the Treaty. This is why the United States, craftily enough, is seeking our substantial return to the Treaty by realizing inspection equivalent to the full compliance with the Safeguards Agreement under the cloak of "continuity of safeguards inspection", avoiding the words of return to the Treaty outwardly.

This increases the suspicion that the United States had intended to coax us with empty talk into return to the Treaty, not completely giving up a nuclear threat to our country and a hostile policy of stifling it from the first.

Under the special circumstances in which we unilaterally and temporarily suspended the effectuation of our withdrawal from the Treaty, there must be a clear distinction between the guarantee of continuity of safeguards and full compliance with the Safeguards Agreement. The full compliance with the Safeguards Agreement must, in any case, be debated and solved in direct links with the United States through future DPRK-USA Talks.

The nuclear problem cannot be solved any time if they try to attribute deliberately our nuclear problem to such working rules as the Safeguards Agreement under the present situation, in which the political factors of our withdrawal from the Treaty still remain.

In a nutshell, the purpose of the United States in demanding only our compliance, itself not moving at all, cannot be construed otherwise than to invent a pretext of sanctions and pressure on us by rendering the situation complicated, not to settle the nuclear problem in actuality.

We make it clear once again that we cannot fully comply with the Safeguards Agreement unless the United States guarantees in deed that it would not try to stifle our system.

The nuclear problem on the Korean peninsula can never be solved through pressure. Only through dialogue and negotiation can it be solved.

We proposed to the United States side the formula of a package solution of the nuclear problem proceeding from the judgement that the major cause of no progress in the solution of the nuclear problem lies in the lack of trust between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States. If the thing is to go well, the questions should be settled one by one with the United States, the assailant, moving first, and us, the sufferer, responding.

But the United States, contrary to its position, is now telling us to move first. This is totally unacceptable. We insist on the formula of a package solution whereby the sides should at least define their work and each side should do its share.

If the third stage of the DPRK-USA Talks are held and an agreement is reached there on the formula of a package solution, a definite prospect for the settlement of the nuclear problem will be opened.

The nuclear problem will be solved smoothly when an agreement is reached on the formula of a package solution and the United States takes a practical action of renouncing the nuclear threat and hostile policy against us and we fully comply with the Safeguards Agreement, remaining committed to the Treaty.

There is no change in our stand to ensure fully the continuity of safeguards until an agreement is reached on the formula of a package solution. Now the matter depends on how the United States responds to our proposal for a package solution, renouncing its hostile policy of stifling the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

This formula will be a touchstone showing whether or not the United States truly has the will to solve the nuclear problem and the will for dialogue.

If the United States does not show a positive response to our proposal, we will have no alternative but to consider that the United States side has no will for a genuine dialogue for the solution of the nuclear problem.

If the International Atomic Energy Agency ignores our sincere proposal for negotiation to ensure the continuity of safeguards and distorts the fact as if the continuity of safeguards in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had

been broken, it would be considered to be a signal urging the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to quit the Non-Proliferation Treaty promptly.

The ball is in the court of the United States and IAEA.

KANG Sok Ju